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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 05-1469
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
     v.
GRADY WHITE,
        Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00615)
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 13, 2006
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and McKAY,* Circuit Judges.
(Filed September 21, 2006)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2FISHER, Circuit Judge.
An appeal may be deemed frivolous, warranting summary affirmance of the
judgment below without further participation of counsel, when it “lacks any basis in law
or fact.”  McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988).  Counsel for the
defendant asserts, in a brief filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
that this appeal satisfies this standard.  The defendant has not argued to the contrary,
despite the opportunity to file a brief in his own behalf.  We agree with counsel’s
assessment.
The defendant was charged by a grand jury with cashing numerous counterfeit
checks at a federally insured financial institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. 
(A. 18.)  He appeared before the District Court in November 2004 and, after an extensive
colloquy, and with the assistance of appointed counsel, entered a plea of guilty to the
indictment.  (A. 16-30.)  He was subsequently sentenced, in February 2005, to a term of
imprisonment of fourteen months, at the upper end of the range recommended by the
United States Sentencing Guidelines.  (A. 1-5.)  The District Court found on the record
that the sentence was justified in light of the nature of the offense, the defendant’s lengthy
criminal history, and the need for deterrence.  (A. 34-48.)
We are convinced, based on a careful review of the record and the brief submitted
by defense counsel, that there are no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal.  The
District Court undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the indictment, which alleged violations
of federal law.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (granting jurisdiction over “all offenses against the
3laws of the United States”).  The defendant was fully apprised during the plea hearing of
the nature of the charged offense and his constitutional rights, and he knowingly and
voluntarily chose to plead guilty and relinquish those rights.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)
(outlining requirements); see also United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 202-03 (3d
Cir. 2006) (same).  The sentence imposed by the District Court is within the range
prescribed by the Guidelines and reflects full consideration of the relevant factors under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as required by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  See id.
at 261 (discussing requirements); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330-32 (3d Cir.
2006) (same).  There is no hint in the record of reversible error.
We will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment of the
District Court.  See 3d Cir. LAR 109.2(a) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. 738).  We also find
that it is unnecessary to appoint counsel to file a petition for rehearing in this Court or a
petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court on the defendant’s behalf.  See id.
109.2(b).
